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Abstract 27 
The clinical assessment of suicidal risk would be significantly complemented by a biologically-based 28 
measure that assesses alterations in the neural representations of concepts related to death and life in 29 
people who engage in suicidal ideation. This study used machine-learning algorithms (Gaussian Naïve 30 
Bayes) to identify such individuals (17 suicidal ideators vs 17 controls) with high (91%) accuracy, based 31 
on their altered fMRI neural signatures of death and life-related concepts. The most discriminating 32 
concepts were death, cruelty, trouble, carefree, good, and praise. A similar classification accurately 33 
(94%) discriminated 9 suicidal ideators who had made a suicide attempt from 8 who had not. Moreover, a 34 
major facet of the concept alterations was the evoked emotion, whose neural signature served as an 35 
alternative basis for accurate (85%) group classification. The study establishes a biological, 36 
neurocognitive basis for altered concept representations in participants with suicidal ideation, which 37 
enables highly accurate group membership classification.  38 
 39 
  40 
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Introduction 41 
The assessment of suicide risk is among the most challenging problems facing mental health 42 
clinicians. The challenge is enormous because suicide is the second-leading cause of death among young 43 
adults 1 and at the same time, clinicians’ predictions and patients’ own predictions of their future suicide 44 
risk have been shown to be relatively poor predictors of future suicide attempt 2,3. In addition, suicidal 45 
patients may disguise their suicidal intent as part of their suicidal planning or to avoid more restrictive 46 
care. Nearly 80% of patients who die by suicide deny suicidal ideation in their last contact with a mental 47 
healthcare professional 4. This status identifies a compelling need to develop markers of suicide risk that 48 
do not rely on self-report. Biologically-based markers of altered conceptual representations have the 49 
potential to complement and improve the accuracy of clinical risk assessment 5,6. 50 
In this study, we offer a new approach to the assessment of suicide risk that uses machine-learning 51 
detection of neural signatures of concepts that have been altered in suicidal individuals. This approach 52 
capitalizes on recent advances in cognitive neuroscience that use machine learning techniques to identify 53 
individual concepts from their functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) signatures 7–9. These fMRI 54 
signatures are common and reproducible across neurotypical individuals. Moreover, the signatures can be 55 
decomposed into meaningful components. For example, the concept of spoon includes a neural 56 
representation of the way it is manipulated (located in motor-related regions), as well as its role in eating 57 
(represented in gustatory areas such as insula and inferior frontal gyrus) 7. By contrast, house is 58 
represented in regions related to shelter and physical setting or location (parahippocampal and parietal 59 
areas) 7. This approach has previously been used to detect altered representations in a special population, 60 
enabling the discrimination between 17 participants with high functioning autism and 17 matched 61 
neurotypical individuals with 97% accuracy, based on their neural representations of 16 social 62 
interactions (such as to hate or hug) 10.  63 
The current study applies this approach to determine whether the neural representations of positive, 64 
negative, and suicide-related concepts are altered in a group of participants with suicidal ideation, relative 65 
to a control group. If so, are the alterations sufficiently systematic to enable an individual participant to be 66 
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accurately classified as a suicidal ideator versus a neurotypical control participant? The study also 67 
investigates whether among participants with suicidal ideation there is a classifiable difference between 68 
those who have attempted suicide and those who have not. Furthermore, the neural signature of the test 69 
concepts was treated as decomposable biomarker of thought processes that can be used to pinpoint 70 
particular components of the alteration. This decomposition attempts to specify a particular component of 71 
the neural signature that is altered, namely the emotion component, as described in more detail below. 72 
Two lines of evidence within the suicide literature motivate the application of this approach to 73 
suicidal individuals. First, suicidal patients have demonstrated sensitivity to distinct concept alterations 74 
through their performance on behavioral measures. One of these measures is an adapted Emotional Stroop 75 
Task that assesses reaction times in response to suicide-related words relative to neutral words 11; another 76 
measure is an adapted Implicit Association Test that assesses reaction times in response to pairing 77 
suicide-related words and self-related words 3. These studies indicate that people with a history of suicide 78 
attempts may represent certain concepts or concept pairs differently than non-attempters. Neural markers 79 
of these behavioral patterns have never been tested. 80 
Building on these previous studies, the current investigation utilizes machine-learning multivoxel 81 
analysis that seeks a pattern of activation values (in a set of voxels distributed across a set of brain 82 
locations) that is associated with individual stimulus concepts, and which can identify an individual as 83 
suicidal or not. 84 
Beyond detecting altered neural signatures of concepts, in the present study we also aimed to detect 85 
the emotion component of the neural signatures. To detect these emotion components, we drew on an 86 
archive of previously acquired identifiable neural signatures from neurotypical participants 8. The archive 87 
contains nine different types of emotion such as sadness or shame. In the analysis of the current study, we 88 
searched for the presence of four of the archived emotion signatures that have previously been detected 89 
among suicidal individuals 12–18: sadness, shame, anger and pride. We hypothesized that the groups 90 
would differ in the degree of presence of these emotion signatures in the neural representations of 91 
concepts such as death. (We assume that the quality of the emotions is similar between neurotypical and 92 
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suicidal participants (e.g. anger, when it occurs, is similar). The ability to classify individual participants 93 
with respect to suicidal risk and to relate their altered activation patterns to altered emotional content 94 
associated with specific concepts would provide an interpretable, personalized profile for diagnosis and 95 
therapy. 96 
In summary, we test three main hypotheses. 97 
1. Participants with suicidal ideation will differ from non-suicidal control participants with regard to 98 
their neural representations of death- and suicide-related concepts, to a degree that a machine-learning 99 
classifier can accurately determine whether a participant is a member of the suicidal ideation group or the 100 
control group.  101 
2. A similar machine-learning approach will accurately discriminate those members of the suicidal 102 
ideator group who have made an attempt at suicide from those who have not. 103 
3. The neural signatures of discriminating concepts in suicidal ideators will contain different emotion 104 
component signatures (i.e. have different regression weights in a linear model) than the control group, and 105 
these group differences will allow a machine-learning classifier to accurately determine whether a 106 
participant is a member of the suicidal ideation group or the control group.  107 
  108 
Results 109 
The main neurosemantic analyses were performed on two groups of participants: 17 suicidal ideators 110 
and 17 healthy controls. The groups were balanced on gender ratio, age, and WASI IQ (Table 1). The 111 
stimuli were 30 concepts (as shown in Table 2) each presented for 3 sec, related to either suicide, positive 112 
affect, or negative affect. The brain locations that contain the main components of the neural 113 
representations of the 30 concepts, identified by the presence of stable voxels (those whose responses to 114 
the set of stimuli were similar over multiple presentations), are shown in Figure 1 (see Methods). Six of 115 
the concepts and five of the brain locations (shown in Figure 2) provided the most accurate discrimination 116 
between the two groups. 117 
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There were interpretable, clinically meaningful differences between the individuals in the suicidal 118 
ideator and control groups, and within the suicidal ideator group, there were differences between the 119 
attempters and non-attempters. The classification procedures identified the concepts and brain locations 120 
that were most predictive of the group membership for these two sets of contrasts (i.e. suicidal ideator vs. 121 
control and attempter ideator vs. non-attempter ideator).  122 
Neurosemantic classification of suicidal ideator versus control group. A Gaussian Naïve Bayes 123 
(GNB) classifier trained on the data of 33 participants (leaving one out) predicted the group membership 124 
of the left-out participant with a high accuracy of 0.91, (p < 0.000001), correctly identifying 15 of the 17 125 
suicidal participants and 16 of the 17 controls (Sensitivity = 0.88, Specificity = 0.94, PPV = 0.94, NPV = 126 
0.89).  127 
The classifier’s features were the neural representations of the 6 most discriminating concepts (as 128 
described in more detail in Methods). The neural representation of each concept, as used by the classifier, 129 
consisted of the mean activation level of the 5 most stable voxels in each of the five most discriminating 130 
locations.   131 
The concepts that most strongly discriminated the groups were death, cruelty, trouble, carefree, 132 
good, and praise. The most discriminating brain regions included the L. superior medial frontal area, 133 
medial frontal/anterior cingulate, R. middle temporal, L. inferior parietal, and L. inferior frontal (as shown 134 
in Figure 2 and Table 3). All of these regions, especially the first two, have repeatedly been strongly 135 
associated with self-referential thought (consistent with the behavioral findings in suicidal patients 136 
reported by 3). The separation between the ideator and control groups in the multidimensional scaling of 137 
the activation features used by the classifier is shown in Figure 3. The distributions of the activation levels 138 
in two locations for the 17 ideator participants and 17 controls for the concepts death and good are shown 139 
in Supplementary Figure 1. 140 
To determine how many and which concepts were most discriminating between ideators and 141 
controls, a reiterative procedure analogous to stepwise regression was used, finding the next most 142 
discriminating concept at each step.  The procedure is further described in Supplementary Information. 143 
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This procedure identified death as the most discriminating single concept, and the concepts that 144 
followed in descending order of discriminating ability were carefree, good, and cruelty, and these were 145 
followed by praise and trouble. To determine how many and which brain locations were most 146 
discriminating between the ideators and controls, a similar stepwise procedure was used. 147 
Because the ideator and control groups differed with respect to other measures besides suicidal 148 
ideation, it is useful to demonstrate that the high classification accuracy remains intact after statistically 149 
controlling for such differences (namely differences in Spielberger Anxiety/State, PHQ, CTQ, and ASR). 150 
When these differences were statistically controlled for (using methods described by 19,20 – see 151 
Supplementary Information for details), the classification accuracy slightly increased (from .91 to .94) 152 
(Sensitivity = 0.88, Specificity = 1, PPV = 1, NPV = 0.94), indicating the applicability of the model to 153 
groups that differ with respect to these clinical variables beyond suicidal ideation. 154 
An additional quantitative assessment of the generalizability of the model applied a more 155 
conservative cross-validation technique. Instead of training the model on data from all but one participant, 156 
this additional assessment left out the data of half of the participants (8 of 17) from each group for testing, 157 
and the model was trained on the remaining 9 participants’ data. (Because there are a huge number of 158 
ways to leave out half of the participants from each group, 1000 random selections of such partitionings 159 
were performed and the outcomes were averaged). The result was that the classification accuracy 160 
remained at a highly reliable level of .76, showing that a model based on a much smaller sample of the 161 
participants generalizes to the other half. This constitutes an added test of model’s generalizability. 162 
Neurosemantic classification of suicidal ideators who have made an attempt vs. ideators who 163 
have not. Another classifier was able to distinguish, within the group of 17 suicidal ideator participants, 164 
those who had previously made an attempt (9 participants) from those who had not (8 participants). This 165 
classification resulted in a high accuracy of .94 (16 out of 17 correct, one non-attempter misclassified, p < 166 
0.0002, Sensitivity = 1.0, Specificity = 0.88, PPV = 0.90, NPV = 1.0). The concepts that best 167 
discriminated between attempters and non-attempters were death, lifeless, and carefree. The most 168 
discriminating brain regions for this classification were a subset of the ones above that discriminated 169 
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ideators from controls, namely L. superior medial frontal, medial frontal/anterior cingulate, and R. middle 170 
temporal. The most discriminating concepts and locations were obtained using the same stepwise 171 
reiterative procedure (described in Supplementary Information) that was used in the ideator-control 172 
classification. The separation between the attempter and non-attempter groups in the multidimensional 173 
scaling of the activation features used by the classifier is shown in Figure 4. The distributions of the 174 
activation levels in two locations for the 9 ideators with a suicide attempt and 8 ideators without such an 175 
attempt for the concepts death and lifeless are shown in Supplementary Figure 2. 176 
Alterations in the emotional content of the neural representations of the discriminating 177 
concepts. Neurosemantic signature measures are interpretable activation patterns that contain information 178 
about the thought processes to which they correspond. This makes it possible to analyze the psychological 179 
nature of an alteration of a given concept in a clinical population. In the case of suicidal ideation, we 180 
postulated that the emotional content of the neural representations of the discriminating words would 181 
differentiate between the suicidal and control groups, consistent with previous behavioral findings 11. 182 
In the analysis of the current results, we searched for the presence of four previously-acquired 183 
emotion signatures (sadness, shame, anger, and pride)8 within the neural representations of the six 184 
concepts that best discriminated ideator and control groups. The reason for using only 4 of the 9 emotions 185 
for which signatures existed was that a model with all 9 emotions (sadness, shame, anger, pride, disgust, 186 
envy, fear, lust, and happiness) would overfit the data (activation levels in 5 most discriminating 187 
locations).  The main rationale for choosing this particular set of four emotions (i.e. sadness shame anger 188 
and pride) is that it resulted in the highest classification accuracy of the two groups. Furthermore, most of 189 
these four emotions have been implicated as precursors and motives for suicidal behavior. Interpersonal 190 
discord (i.e., anger) and embarrassment are two prominent motivations for adolescent suicide attempts 21. 191 
Shame is prominent in studies of male suicide attempters 22. In a content analysis of over 1200 suicide 192 
notes, sadness (e.g., hopelessness, sorrow), anger (e.g., anger, blame), and guilt were particularly 193 
prominent, although positive emotions that expressed relief either on the part of the suicide victim or the 194 
intended recipient of the note were common 23. However, note that our neurosemantic tests here probe for 195 
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the emotional content in the representation of particular concepts (such as death), not for an enduring 196 
emotional trait. 197 
The neurosemantic signature of each of the six discriminating concepts was modeled as a linear 198 
combination of sadness, shame, anger and pride, with the expectation that there would be group 199 
differences in the regression weights of the emotions. Consistent with this expectation, in the suicidal 200 
group, the concept of death reliably (t(32)=2.67, p < .012) evoked more (had a higher regression weight 201 
for) shame whereas the concept of trouble evoked reliably more sadness in this group (t(32) = 2.24, p < 202 
.032). (These t tests are uncorrected for multiple comparisons, to provide an initial overview). Trouble 203 
also evoked reliably less anger (t(32) = 2.78, p < .01) and carefree evoked less pride (t(32) = 2.96, p < 204 
.006) in the suicide ideation group. In general, the negatively-valenced discriminating concepts evoked 205 
more sadness and shame but less anger in the suicidal ideation group.  206 
In ideators who had made an attempt, the suicide-related concept death, evoked reliably less sadness 207 
(t(15) = 2.91, p < .01) than in those who had not made an attempt, and the other suicide-related concept 208 
lifeless evoked reliably more anger (t(15) = 3.58, p < .003) than in those ideators who had not made an 209 
attempt. Furthermore, in the ideators who had made an attempt, the positive concept carefree evoked 210 
reliably less anger (t(15) = 2.34, p < .03 ).  211 
These results are generally consistent with previous fMRI findings of altered emotion processing at 212 
the neural level (in response to face stimuli) in suicidal participants 24. To more systematically assess the 213 
emotion signature group differences, the emotion signature weights were used as features of a classifier 214 
that attempted to identify group membership. 215 
Identifying group membership on the basis of emotion signature differences in the 216 
distinguishing concepts. We investigated whether the emotional content of the neural signature of a 217 
concept could indicate whether a given participant was an ideator or a control participant, or, within 218 
ideators, whether they had made an attempt or not. The features that were used in this classification were 219 
the regression coefficients in the model above, indicating the degree of presence of each of the emotion 220 
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signatures in their neural representation of each discriminating concept (e.g. how much shame was 221 
present in a participant’s neural representation of death).  222 
The GNB classifier correctly identified the group membership (ideator or control) of the 34 223 
participants with 0.85 accuracy (14 ideators and 15 controls correctly identified, Sensitivity = 0.82, 224 
Specificity = 0.88, PPV = 0.88, NPV = 0.83). (Using the regression weights of only two of the emotions 225 
(pride and shame) resulted in the same classification accuracy (0.85) as using all four emotions). The 226 
distributions of emotion regression weights of sadness and shame in the representations of death and 227 
good for the 17 ideator participants and 17 controls are shown in Supplementary Figure 3. 228 
The same approach of using emotion regression coefficients as features was applied to distinguishing 229 
the nine ideators who had made an attempts versus the eight who had not in the set of 17 ideators. Using 230 
the regression coefficients of the emotions of the three concepts that best discriminated attempters from 231 
non-attempters (death, lifeless, and carefree) as classifier features, it was possible to identify the group 232 
membership of the 17 participants as attempters or non-attempters with 0.88 accuracy (eight attempters 233 
and seven non-attempters were identified correctly; Sensitivity = 0.89, Specificity = 0.88, PPV = 0.89, 234 
NPV = 0.88). (As in the classification above, it was possible to achieve comparable accuracy using only a 235 
subset of the predictor variables.) 236 
Thus the alterations of the neural signatures of the discriminating concepts in the ideator group and 237 
within that group, in the attempter sub-group, can be meaningfully attributed in large part to their evoking 238 
a different profile of specific emotions than in the comparison group. (These two classification accuracies 239 
based on the emotion signature weights, .85 and .88, were only slightly lower than the classification 240 
accuracies based directly on the activation data, .91 and .94.). This result indicates the emotional content 241 
is a significant way  in which concepts are altered in suicidality and in suicidality after attempt, and thus 242 
provides potential targets for therapy. 243 
Correlations between neural alterations of concept representations and self-report measures of 244 
suicidal ideation. The degree of neural alteration of concepts in individual suicidal ideators can be 245 
quantitatively assessed and related to the self-reported measure of suicidal ideation. The neural 246 
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representation here for each suicidal ideator participant was the vector of activation levels for the six most 247 
distinguishing concepts in the three most distinguishing brain regions (namely the control group locations 248 
shown in Table 3). The neurotypical norm to which this measure was compared was the mean of the 249 
corresponding vectors averaged across the control participants. The measure of alteration for each suicidal 250 
ideator was the distance from this norm (computed as one minus the correlation between the control 251 
group mean vector and the suicidal ideator participant’s vector). There was a marginally reliable 252 
correlation (r = 0.48, p < 0.051) between the degree of concept alteration and the log-transformed self-253 
reported Adult Suicidal Ideation Questionnaire (ASIQ) measure of suicidality, as shown in 254 
Supplementary Figure 4. 255 
Locations of the neural representations (clusters of stable voxels) for the two groups. There was 256 
a substantial similarity in neural representation of 30 concepts between the two groups in terms of the 257 
involved brain locations, with one large exception. Only the control group had clusters of stable voxels in 258 
anterior frontal regions, namely the superior medial frontal and anterior cingulate areas, whereas the 259 
ideator group showed negligible stable activation in these frontal regions, as shown in Figure 1. By 260 
contrast, the ideator group had more clusters of stable voxels in the L. inferior parietal region. (Recall that 261 
stable voxels are those that have a similar semantic tuning curve across the 30 stimulus concepts in each 262 
of the multiple presentations of the stimulus set). These distinguishing brain locations play a substantial 263 
role in discriminating between the ideator and control participants on the basis of the neural activation 264 
evoked by the discriminating concepts. Notably, the accuracy of identifying which of the 30 stimulus 265 
items that the participant was thinking about based on its fMRI signature was similar for the two groups: 266 
.71 and .75 for the suicidal ideator and control groups respectively.  267 
GLM univariate analyses of the same groups of participants (17 ideators and 17 controls) as in the 268 
main classification failed to show FDR- or family-wise-corrected significant between groups in the 269 
activation patterns for all 30 concepts considered together, nor for various subsets of the concepts, such as 270 
the six discriminating concepts, nor for any of the three categories of concepts. By contrast, the 271 
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multivoxel analyses of the patterns corresponding to individual concepts as described above provided 272 
excellent group separability. 273 
A test of the classification algorithm on another sample. The data of 21 additional ideator 274 
participants, although excluded from the main analyses because of the lower technical quality of their 275 
data, were nevertheless available to use as a test of the generalization of the classifier to another sample.  276 
The data quality was measured in terms of the low accuracy of classification of the 30 stimulus items (< 277 
.60 rank accuracy) and the generally greater head motion parameters (mean maximum = 1.81 mm) than 278 
the 17 participants in the main study (mean = 1.27 mm, t (77) = 2.73, p < 0.01). Nevertheless, the 279 
classifier developed from the first set of 17 ideators and 17 controls was used, without any modifications, 280 
to try to distinguish these 21 suicidal ideators from the 17 control participants with good data quality. As 281 
in the main classification, the classifier’s features were the neural representations of the 6 most 282 
discriminating concepts. The neural representation of each concept consisted of the mean activation level 283 
of the 5 most stable voxels in each of the five most discriminating locations.  The resulting classification 284 
accuracy was 0.87 (p < 0.000002; Sensitivity: 0.81; Specificity: 0.94; PPV: 0.94: NPV: 0.8), replicating 285 
the findings from the main analysis. Although high quality data from both the ideator group and the 286 
control group may be necessary for model development, once a model is developed, it can accurately 287 
classify suicidal participants with lower data quality. Thus, the findings were replicated on a second 288 
sample of ideators, supporting the generalizability of the model. 289 
The model also did reasonably well in identifying concept alterations associated with having made 290 
an attempt within the excluded 21 suicidal ideators. Those participants who had made an attempt versus 291 
those who had not were correctly classified with an accuracy of 0.61 (p < .04, 13 of 21 participants 292 
correctly classified).  293 
These results indicate that the models developed on the basis of the data of participants with less 294 
noise in their data can be successfully applied to participants with more noisy data. However, a model that 295 
is developed from the data of either ideator or control participants with noisy data does not discriminate 296 
groups well. We attribute such noise to inability to rigorously sustain attention to the task and to maintain 297 
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head position in the scanner. The implication is that high quality data from both the ideator group and the 298 
control group are necessary for model development, but once a model is developed, it can achieve 299 
accurate identification of suicidal ideator participants with lower data quality. 300 
By testing the performance of the neurosemantic classifier on the additional larger sample of 301 
independent ideator participants beyond those who provided the data for the classification algorithm, we 302 
provide a replication within this study, thus strengthening support for the generalizability of the model, 303 
which applies to all of the recruited participants. 304 
Discussion 305 
The findings from this study provide a biological foundation for altered concept representations in 306 
those with suicidal thoughts and recent suicidal behavior. The differences in the neural representations of 307 
concepts enable accurate classification of suicidal ideator versus control group membership, as well as 308 
suicidal ideator versus suicide attempter – the latter distinction being one that few risk factors are able to 309 
make 17. These two findings show that suicidal ideation and attempt are associated with measurable 310 
alterations in the way a person thinks about death, suicide, and other positive and negative concepts. The 311 
recently-developed fMRI methods for measuring the neural representation of a concept makes it possible 312 
to compare neurotypical to clinical representations of concepts, and within a clinical population, to 313 
compare suicidal ideation with and without suicidal behavior. 314 
The specific concepts that were altered in people with suicidal ideation, death, cruelty, trouble, 315 
carefree, good, and praise, include items from all three stimulus categories, one that is suicide-related, 316 
two that are negative, and three positive concepts. The valuation of what is important and good in life and 317 
what is not appears to be altered in ideators. Our results provide a neurally-based, quantitative measure of 318 
this alteration.  319 
Most of the ideators showed high levels of self-reported depression that is characterized by the 320 
“cognitive triad,” which includes a negative view of self, the world, and the future 25. Pessimism about the 321 
future, or hopelessness, has been shown to be correlated with and predictive of future suicidal behavior 322 
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above and beyond depression 26,27. The observed alterations of specific concepts may be reflecting more 323 
general cognitive changes of this type. 324 
The differences in the emotion signature components of the altered concepts provide additional 325 
information about the nature of the perspective change. As described above, the concept of death evoked 326 
more shame while the concept of trouble evoked more sadness in the suicidal group. Trouble also evoked 327 
less anger in the suicidal ideation group. The positive concept carefree evoked less pride in the suicidal 328 
ideation group. This pattern of differences in emotional response suggests that the altered perspective in 329 
suicidal ideation may reflect a resigned acceptance of a current or future negative state of affairs, 330 
manifested by listlessness, defeat, as well as a degree of anhedonia (less pride in carefree). This type of 331 
neurally-acquired information helps characterize the disorder as well as providing specific targets for 332 
intervention.  333 
The altered perspective seems even more clear in the contrast between suicidal ideators who had 334 
made an attempt versus those who had not, where the most altered concepts were death, lifeless, and 335 
carefree, which includes two suicide related concepts and one positive concept. The finding of a 336 
meaningful difference between ideators with and without a history of a suicide attempt is consistent with 337 
previous findings showing differential reaction times in response to suicide-related words relative to 338 
neutral words 11, and in response to the paired concepts of death and self versus life and self 3. 339 
Furthermore, the emotion signature differences show an interpretable pattern. For example, the suicide-340 
related concept death evoked less sadness in the ideators who had made an attempt than in those who had 341 
not. The two subgroups of ideators differ in their emotional response to particular concepts.  342 
Those ideators who had made an attempt may have thought of death with less sadness than those 343 
ideators who had not, whereas the overall group of ideators experienced more shame than controls when 344 
thinking about death. It has been shown that many suicidal ideators vacillate between an attraction to life 345 
and attraction to death 28, and that having moral objections to suicide is protective against engaging in a 346 
suicidal act even with suicidal ideation 29.  347 
 15 
 
We speculate that for those who are conflicted about engaging in a suicidal act, the thought of 348 
facilitating death is shameful, whereas those ideators who have made an attempt show greater attraction to 349 
and acceptance of death, and hence less sadness in thinking about it. This perspective is also consistent 350 
with decreased anger associated with the concept of lifeless in ideators with a history of an attempt. 351 
Neuroimaging studies also provide evidence of emotion alteration associated with suicide risk. fMRI 352 
studies have found altered processing of angry faces in suicide attempters, and anger and hostility are 353 
strongly related to suicidal behavior 24,30, and hostility is also strongly predictive of suicidal behavior 31,32. 354 
More generally, the ability of a machine learning classifier to make discriminations within the 355 
suicidal ideator group speaks to the specificity of the neurosemantic assessment approach. The classifier 356 
is not simply detecting an abnormality that is likely to be present in many disorders, such as depression. It 357 
makes accurate discriminations within the ideator group, distinguishing those who had a previous history 358 
of a suicide attempt, and thus are at higher risk for future suicidal behavior. While it is possible that these 359 
findings were due to the greater severity of suicidal ideation and depression in past attempters, the 360 
specificity of the discriminating concepts, death and suicide speak to a possible application of the 361 
approach in the assessment of imminent suicidal risk. Moreover, we have identified differences in the 362 
emotions experienced by those ideators with and without a history of  suicide attempt , such as differences 363 
in anger in thinking about death that are not likely to be explained merely by differences in depressive 364 
symptoms. 365 
There are several types of evidence indicating that the activation pattern (neural signature) for a 366 
given emotion truly indexes that emotion. First, the emotion signatures are sufficiently specific to 367 
accurately identify which emotion was being experienced in the Kassam et al.8 study. Second, in a 368 
validation check of the emotion manipulation (an instruction to drama student participants to evoke a 369 
particular verbally named emotion such as shame), a separate condition presented IAPS pictures 370 
(International Affective Picture System) depicting disgust. The classifier trained on the instruction-evoked 371 
activation patterns of the emotions correctly identified the emotion evoked by the disgust pictures with 372 
.91 rank accuracy, indicating the strong similarity of the disgust activation patterns evoked in two very 373 
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different ways, which speaks to the construct validity of the measure. Third, the neural signatures of the 374 
emotions in the Kassam et al.8 study were similar across participants, such that a classifier trained on the 375 
emotion signatures of all but one participant could identify the emotions of the left-out participant with 376 
.71 rank accuracy. This finding of the commonality of emotion signatures across participants indicates the 377 
convergent validity of these neural signatures. The current study provides additional evidence for 378 
reliability and usefulness of the approach by finding that the emotions signature weights in a concept 379 
representation are features that can identify membership in the ideator group. Given the limited previous 380 
use of this potentially powerful approach to analyzing emotional content from neural signatures, there 381 
should be caution concerning the inferences that can be made.  382 
Thus the findings also enable progress beyond saying that one group is measurably different from 383 
another. They enable at least part of the difference to be attributed to the emotional component of a 384 
concept representation. Unlike a dictionary definition of a concept, a neural representation includes the 385 
emotional response to the concept. Some concepts, such as snake, have long been known to entail an 386 
emotional response. The findings here show that certain concepts evoke different emotions in people with 387 
suicidal ideation compared to controls, and also evoke different emotions in suicidal ideators dependent 388 
on whether they have ever made a suicide attempt. When used as the features of a classifier, these 389 
differences in the emotion component in the neural signature of a concept can be used to provide accurate 390 
classification of group membership (in both the ideator-control classification and the attempter-non 391 
attempter classification). 392 
fMRI capabilities have made it possible to characterize the altered brain activity of a clinical 393 
population as having a higher or lower level of activation in some brain region (say anterior cingulate) 394 
than a control group during the performance of some task. By contrast, our approach attempts to 395 
characterize a network of altered neural activity that constitutes the representation of a concept and the 396 
emotion it evokes. At a given brain location, for some concepts the activation level is higher in the ideator 397 
group and for other concepts it is lower. The current study makes an early attempt at relating a pattern of 398 
activation values across multiple brain locations to neurotypical and altered representations of particular 399 
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concepts and their emotional component in a manner that seeks consilience between brain activity and 400 
psychological states. At the same time, it remains possible to determine which brain structures are the 401 
sites of a clinical alteration.  402 
This study is distinctive  in neuroimaging research on suicidal ideation and behavior because it 403 
directly focuses on how suicidal individuals think about various concepts, rather than on responses to 404 
tasks, that however salient, do not mirror the experience of the suicidal person as directly. This 405 
neurosemantic assessment has face validity because those suicide attempters at highest risk and with the 406 
highest suicide intent engaged in suicidal ideation because they wanted to die (and thus thought about 407 
suicide as more attractive) or wanted to escape an impossible situation or feeling state, which might lead 408 
to altered responses to various death and life related concepts.  409 
There are several potential benefits of this neurosemantic approach. The identification of differential 410 
patterns of regional activation could suggest brain regions to target using brain stimulation techniques 411 
such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) or transcranial direct current stimulation (tdcs) 33. The 412 
identification of altered emotional responses to suicide related concepts could prove very useful to a 413 
psychotherapist in trying to heighten the patient’s attraction to life, and decrease the attraction to suicide 414 
and death. If these new findings have predictive value, then they would also be useful in guiding a 415 
clinician’s decisions about psychotherapeutic targets and in monitoring overall suicidal risk. The 416 
neurosemantic approach can also guide the development of less costly and more easily disseminable 417 
methods that can potentially yield similar information, such as EEG assessment of neural concept 418 
representations, as demonstrated for neurotypical participants 34. And despite its greater cost, this 419 
approach might be effective in highly suicidal individuals who are repeatedly hospitalized for suicidal 420 
crises or those who require a higher level of care, such as an intensive outpatient program. 421 
An unexplored prospective benefit of the approach is its potential to predict imminent suicidal risk. 422 
A longitudinal investigation of a larger cohort of individuals with suicidal ideation could repeatedly 423 
assess the altered neural representations to determine whether there is a neural signature of an imminent 424 
attempt. Such information would be invaluable in the case of the small percentage (e.g., 5%) of patients in 425 
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psychiatric inpatient care who make up as much as half of suicides subsequent to discharge from a 426 
hospital 35. In future prospective studies, it would be of great interest to learn if our neurosemantic 427 
assessments are useful in monitoring for current suicidal risk and in predicting future suicide attempts. If 428 
so, this approach could be useful for monitoring ongoing suicidal risk and response to treatment.  429 
Study limitations. Performance of the task requires highly cooperative and focused participants (not 430 
everyone can keep their attention intensely focused for 30 minutes). However, we also showed that the 431 
models developed on the less noisy participants’ data can be successfully applied to more noisy data from 432 
other participants, which substantially improves the chances for potential clinical applications. Moreover, 433 
it may be possible in the future to develop shorter batteries that focus on concepts most likely to identify 434 
altered responses associated with suicidal risk and which would require sustained attention over a shorter 435 
period. 436 
Another limitation is that the current study does not provide a contrast between suicidal ideation and 437 
psychiatric control participants who are affected by psychopathology in general. However, the ability to 438 
distinguish within the suicidal ideation group between attempters and non-attempters suggests that our 439 
classification is more specific and not just related to psychopathology in general. Within its limitations, 440 
the current study provides a promising first step in assessing a psychiatric disorder of brain and mind that 441 
takes both of these facets into account. 442 
Methods 443 
Participants. Participants were 79 young adults, either affected with current suicidal ideation (n = 444 
38) or healthy controls with no personal or family history of psychiatric disorder or suicide attempt (n = 445 
41). Exclusion criteria included neurological disorders, anoxia history, head injuries, Wechsler verbal 446 
score < 80 36, current use of sedative medication, pregnancy, ineligibility for magnetic resonance imaging 447 
(MRI), psychosis, substance misuse or positive urine drug/saliva alcohol screen.  448 
Assessment. History of suicide attempt (defined as potentially self-injurious behavior with some 449 
non-zero intention of dying) was assessed with the Suicide History Form and Suicide Intent Scale 450 
37,38. The severity of suicidal ideation was assessed using the interview-rated Columbia-Suicide Severity 451 
 19 
 
Rating Scale (C-SSRS) 39, and the self-reported Adult Suicide Ideation Questionnaire(A-SIQ)40. General 452 
psychopathology, depression, anxiety, and history of child maltreatment were assessed using the Adult 453 
Self Report (ASR)41,42,  the Patient Health Questionnaire- 9(PHQ-9)43, the Adult Spielberger State Trait 454 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T)44, and the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ)45, respectively. 455 
Participants in neurosemantic analyses. The neurosemantic analyses below are based on 34 456 
participants, 17 per group whose fMRI data quality was sufficient for accurate (normalized rank accuracy 457 
> .6) identification of the 30 individual concepts from their fMRI signatures. The selection of participants 458 
included in the primary analyses was based only on the technical quality of the fMRI data. The data 459 
quality was assessed in terms of the ability of a classifier to identify which of the 30 individual concepts 460 
they were thinking about with a rank accuracy of at least .6, based on the concepts’ neural signatures. The 461 
participants who met this criterion also showed less head motion (t(77) = 2.73, p < .01). The criterion was 462 
not based on group discriminability. The 17 selected for the primary data analysis and the 21 remaining 463 
suicidal participants did not differ on demographic data, diagnoses, clinical severity of depression, 464 
anxiety, or suicidal ideation, or history of suicide attempt. The data of the participants with poor data 465 
quality were also analyzed, as reported in the Results section. 466 
A previous study of ASD using a similar approach10 used 17 participants with good data quality per 467 
group, hence the target of a similar sample size. Three additional control participants who had also 468 
satisfied this criterion were selected at random and excluded to equate the group sizes. The final groups 469 
were balanced on gender ratio, age, and WASI IQ. Participants in the suicidal ideator group were 470 
significantly more symptomatic than the control group on almost all other measures, as shown in Table 1. 471 
There were no systematic differences between the 17 ideators whose data were used in the neurosemantic 472 
analysis and the 21 whose data were excluded, other than the poor classification accuracy on the 30 473 
concepts. We attribute the sub-optimal fMRI data quality (inaccurate concept identification from its 474 
neural signature) of the excluded participants to some combination of excessive head motion and inability 475 
to sustain attention to the task of repeatedly thinking about each stimulus concept for 3 sec over a 30 min 476 
testing period. Despite their exclusion from the main neurosemantic analysis, we show below that there 477 
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remains valuable information in the fMRI data of the excluded suicidal ideator participants. The 478 
comparison of self-report data between the 34 participants included in the neurosemantic analyses and the 479 
remaining (excluded) participants is reported in Supplementary Information. 480 
The study protocol was approved by the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University 481 
Institutional Review Boards. All participants gave their informed written consent. 482 
Stimuli. The stimuli were three groups of 10 words each, half of them nouns and half adjectives 483 
related to: (1) suicide (e.g., death, overdose); (2) negative affect (e.g., sad, gloom); and (3) positive affect 484 
(e.g., happy, carefree) as shown in Table 2. The set of 30 stimulus items was presented 6 times, in 485 
different random orders. Each item was displayed for 3 sec followed by a 4 sec blank interval to allow for 486 
the hemodynamic response to take its course. Seventeen sec long fixation intervals were included 487 
periodically to provide an activation baseline. The stimuli were displayed in white font and centered on a 488 
black background. 489 
Task instructions. Participants were asked to actively think about the concepts to which the 490 
stimulus words refer while they were displayed, thinking about their main properties (and filling in details 491 
that come to mind) and attempting consistency across presentations. 492 
Image acquisition and preprocessing. The fMRI data were acquired on a Siemens Verio 3.0 Tesla 493 
scanner (20 slices, voxel size 3.125 x 3.125 x 5 mm, repetition time 1s). The data were pre-processed and 494 
converted to a standard MNI space using SPM8 (Wellcome Dept. of Cog. Neurology), and a single mean 495 
value was computed for each voxel and stimulus item (see Supplementary Information for details). 496 
fMRI data analytic approach. Three analyses are described here: (1) selecting voxels with stable 497 
semantic tuning curves; (2) spatial clustering of the stable voxels at the group level to determine the 498 
brain locations that contain the neural representations of the concepts; and (3) developing a resulting 499 
machine learning classification model from the reduced data, and attempting to classify participants’ 500 
group membership using the model.  501 
1. Selecting voxels with stable semantic tuning curves. These analyses focus on a subset of all 502 
the voxels (each ~50 mm3) whose semantic tuning curve of activation over the set of stimulus items is 503 
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stable across the multiple presentations of the set of items (see Supplementary Information for details).  504 
 2. Obtaining group-level clusters of stable voxels. A fixed number of the most stable voxels are 505 
selected in each participant (excluding bilateral occipital lobes), and a group hit map is computed and 506 
thresholded by the number of contributing participants and spatial proximity (see Supplementary 507 
Information for details). The clusters of stable voxels in the group hit maps indicate where the set of 508 
neural representations (including all of the concepts) are located for the two groups, as shown in Figure 509 
1. Preliminary testing identified which of the clusters best discriminated between the two groups (see 510 
Supplementary Information). The classifier’s features included voxels in clusters that are common 511 
between the two groups as well as voxels from unshared clusters. 512 
3. Machine learning methods. Machine learning entails training a classifier on a subset of the 513 
data and testing the classifier on an independent subset. The cross-validation procedure iterates through 514 
all possible partitionings (folds) of the data always keeping the training and test sets separate from each 515 
other. The main machine learning here uses a Gaussian Naïve Bayes (GNB) classifier (using pooled 516 
variance). The main type of classifications  performed in this study was a group membership 517 
classification that assigned each participant to one of the two groups; the accuracy was the proportion 518 
of correctly classified participants, and significance levels were obtained using a binomial distribution, 519 
and b) identification of which of the 30 concepts a participant was thinking about; in this case, rank 520 
accuracy was computed (see Supplementary Information for details) and compared to a chance level of 521 
accuracy obtained by random permutation testing. 522 
The main reason that classification was used rather than General Linear Modeling (GLM) is that 523 
classification is multivariate whereas GLM uses univariate analysis of fMRI data (assessing each voxel 524 
independently). The phenomena of interest here (and in many fMRI studies of cognition) are inherently 525 
multivariate, in the sense that such cognitively-related  phenomena typically occur in a number of 526 
different voxels or voxel clusters that need not be proximal to each other. In particular, the neural 527 
representations of individual concepts such as apple or death correspond to activation in a set of spatially 528 
distributed voxel clusters, and the groups here differ in the collective pattern of activation levels in these 529 
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spatially distributed voxels.  GLM, because of its univariate nature, fails to assess both the collective 530 
pattern and the group differences in the collective pattern. By contrast, the classifier’s features are the set 531 
of activation levels of a set of spatially distributed voxels. Very many other studies show greater 532 
sensitivity of classification over GLM where the phenomena of interest consist of a spatially distributed 533 
pattern of activation. 534 
Group membership classification. Two types of group classification were performed: 1. suicidal 535 
ideator vs control group, consisting of 17 participants in each group, and, 2. within the suicidal ideator 536 
group, attempters (n=9) vs. non-attempters (n=8). Both types of classification were based on fMRI data in 537 
the sets of group-level stable clusters identified for both groups. 538 
The features used by the classifier to characterize a participant consisted of a vector of activation 539 
levels for a number of (discriminating) concepts in a set of (discriminating) brain locations. To determine 540 
how many and which concepts were most discriminating between ideators and controls, a reiterative 541 
procedure analogous to stepwise regression was used, first finding the single most discriminating concept, 542 
and then the second most discriminating concept, reiterating until the next step reduced the accuracy. A 543 
similar procedure was used to determine the most discriminating locations (clusters). The procedure is 544 
further described in Supplementary Information. The activation level in each brain location was computed 545 
as a mean activation of the five most stable voxels in that location. The classifier was trained on the data 546 
of all but one participant, and the group membership of the left out participant was predicted. 547 
In addition to group membership classification based on the neural representations of the stimulus 548 
concepts themselves, another classification was based on the emotional content of the neural 549 
representations of the discriminating concepts. The discriminating concepts’ activation was represented as 550 
a weighted sum of activation vectors characterizing the involvement of four emotions: sadness, shame, 551 
anger and pride. Each participant was characterized by a vector consisting of the weights associated with 552 
these emotions for each discriminating concept, and the participants’ group membership was classified 553 
using a machine learning procedure similar to the one described above (see Supplementary Information 554 
for details). 555 
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Classification of 30 concepts. This procedure attempted to identify which of the 30 concepts a 556 
participant was thinking about, given an independent sample of its neural signature. This measure 557 
provided an index of the inconsistency or noise level in a participant’s neural signature data. 558 
Data availability. The de-identified data that support the main findings of this study are available 559 
from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 560 
Code availability. The custom computer code that was used in the main analysis of this study is 561 
available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 562 
 563 
 564 
  565 
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Figure Captions 701 
Figure 1. Clusters of stable voxels of the suicidal ideator group and the control group. White ellipses 702 
indicate the 5 discriminating locations. 703 
 704 
Figure 2. Discriminating brain locations for distinguishing suicidal ideator versus control group 705 
membership. 706 
 707 
Figure 3. Group separation in the multidimensional scaling of the activation features of the 34 708 
participants’ (17 ideators and 17 controls) used by the classifier.  709 
Ideators are indicated by red circles, controls by blue circles. Filled circles indicate misclassifications. 710 
The scaled features (activation levels in 5 brain locations for 6 discriminating words) were computed in 711 
32 cross-validation folds, averaged across the folds. The dashed line shows the separability of the two 712 
groups in this 2D space. 713 
 714 
Figure 4. Group separation in the multidimensional scaling of the activation features of the 9 ideators with 715 
suicide attempts (diagonally filled circles) and the 8 ideators without attempts (horizontally filled circles) 716 
used by the classifier. 717 
The features (activation levels in 3 brain locations for 3 discriminating words) were scaled in 2 718 
dimensions. The dashed line shows the separability of the two groups in this 2D space.  719 
 720 
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Table 1. Demographic information and clinical variables 723 
 Participants  
 Suicidal 
Ideators 
         (n =17) 
Controls 
(n = 17) 
Test Statistic      
(df) 
p-value 
Measure     
Gender (Male:Female) 5:12 3:14 χ2 (1) = 0.63 0.42
Mean Age  22.88 
(3.57)
22.06 
(2.84)
t(32) = 0.74 0.46
WASI1 IQ  124.1 
(10.86)
121.12 
(9.70)
t(32) = 0.82 0.420
ASIQ2 57.88 
(34.38)
2.76 
(6.35)
t(32) = 6.5 0.000
PHQ-93 12.24 
(6.7)
0.47 
(1.1)
t(32) = 7.14 0.000
Spielberger/Anxiety State 40.12 
(6.14)
46.88 
(4.77)
t(32) = 3.59 0.001
Spielberger/Anxiety Trait 47.59 
(4.14)
45.88 
(3.22)
t(32) = 1.34 0.19
CTQ4 41.3 
(9.65)
30.24 
(8.11)
t(32) = 3.62 0.001
ASR5 internalizing problems 35.6 
(11.9)
5.9 
(5.0)
t(32) = 9.46  0.000
ASR externalizing problems 13.9 
(9.8)
4.8 
(3.5)
t(32) = 3.60 0.001
ASR total problems 83.1 
(27.09)
19.65 
(12.65)
t(32) = 8.74 0.000
Number of Attempts 1.41 
(2.0)
 
SIS6  8.19 
(9.06)
 
 724 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 725 
1 Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; 726 
2 Adult Suicide Ideation Questionnaire; 727 
3 Patient Health Questionnaire; 728 
4 Child Trauma Questionnaire; 729 
5 Adult Self Report; 730 
6 Suicidal Ideation Scale 731 
 32 
 
Table 2. Stimulus concepts 732 
Suicide Positive Negative 
apathy bliss boredom 
death carefree criticism 
desperate comfort cruelty 
distressed excellent evil 
fatal good gloom 
funeral innocent guilty 
hopeless kindness inferior 
lifeless praise terrible 
overdose superior trouble 
suicide vitality worried 
 733 
 734 
 735 
  736 
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Table 3. Cluster locations predictive for suicidal ideator-control group membership classification 737 
 738 
Brain region 
MNI centroid 
coordinates Radius (mm) 
x y z 
Suicidal ideator group 
L. inferior parietal (LIPS) -42 -43 50 5.0 
LIFG triangularis -42 29 8 5.1 
Control group 
L. superior medial frontal -11 52 33 10.5 
Medial frontal/Anterior cingulate -6 50 -3 8.3 
R. middle temporal 56 -62 10 2.5 
 739 
 740 
 741 
 742 
 743 
 744 




